Fiscal and monetary policy interaction

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Strategic Interaction between Fiscal and Monetary Policies in an Export-Oriented Economy Sergey Merzlyakov Junior Research Fellow of the Laboratory for Macroeconomic Analysis National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow


Motivation Literature on Fiscal and Monetary Policy Interaction Model Strategic Interaction ConclusionContents


MotivationWhy strategic interaction? Complementary policy instruments Joint constraint Peculiarity of macroeconomic development in an export-oriented economy Optimal macroeconomic policy design Central bank independence: do we really need it?


Fiscal and monetary policy interaction: Christ (1979), Sargent and Wallace (1981), Blinder (1982) Strategic complementarity instruments: Andersen and Schneider (1986), Dixit and Lambertini (2003) New political economy in macroeconomics setup: Drazen (2000), Persson and Tabellini (2000) Literature review


Two-period model Key pointsEndogenous variables:Predetermined variables: all variables in period 0Policy variables:Fiscal policy Discretionary policy (lump-sum taxes, government expenditure) Automatic stabilizers (taxes that depend on export and output) Stabilization fund (as the sterilization mechanism of excessive money) Monetary policy The only transmission monetary channel is foreign currency operations Exchange rate target Export and import depend on exchange rate By changing the international reserves, the central bank changes the supply of money


Phillips CurveAggregate DemandGovernment Budget ConstraintBalance of PaymentForeign Exchange Market OperationsReal Exchange RateMoney in CirculationModelSocial Loss Function


Forms of strategic interactionThe government loss:The central bank loss:Dependent central bank: fiscal and monetary policy coordination Independent central bank: Stackelberg interaction with the government leadership Cournot interaction (central bank and government do not take each others’ actions into account when choosing their policies)


What is the optimal bargaining power of the government relative to the central bank?Coordination: the loss function


Coordination is effective only if the bargaining power of the central bank is relatively largeCoordination: the bargaining power


Agents’ losses are sensitive to fiscal policyCentral bank independence: agents’ losses


ConclusionIn an export-oriented economy the independence of the central bank does not play a significant role Coordination is preferable if the bargaining power of the central bank is relatively large Interaction with the government leadership is preferable if the output is government priority Next: to compare different monetary policy regimes (exchange rate target vs. growth rate of money target), to analyze other forms of strategic interaction (the central bank leadership)


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Last Updated: 8th March 2018